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THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND THE CASE OF BAHRAIN
INTRODUCTION

T

he evolution of international law towards a system capable of
promoting “global justice” has been accompanied by a growing
consensus that States bear an obligation both to punish wrongdoers and
to act on behalf of victims in the wake of widespread, systematic human
rights abuses.1 In fact, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/147, Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, sets forth “existing,”
complementary international legal obligations of States in this arena
without introducing new obligations.2 The right to a remedy is premised
on three core rights: (1) the right to “equal and effective access to justice”; (2) “the right to adequate, effective and prompt reparation for the
harm suffered”; and (3) “the right to truth.”3 Despite being a U.N. Member State since September 21, 1971,4 the Kingdom of Bahrain (“Bahrain”) is a nation with a disturbing legacy of unaddressed human rights
abuses and impunity for perpetrators.5 Such incongruence raises fundamental questions with respect to the current international legal frame-

1. Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 478–79 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006). See
also PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 170 (2002).
2. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
Principles]. In addition to the 2006 Principles, the U.N. General Assembly previously
addressed the rights of victims in adopting the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. However, the 1985 Declaration focuses on the rights of victims of domestic crimes whereas the 2006 Principles are essentially
“an international bill of rights of victims.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victim’s Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (2006).
3. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 260.
4. See United Nations List of Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml
(last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
5. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE: A SURVEY OF LAW & PRACTICE: BAHRAIN
COUNTRY REPORT S. 2.1 (May 2003) [hereinafter REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE].
See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN BAHRAIN 10 (1997) [hereinafter HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE,
ROUTINE DENIAL]; REDRESS, SUBMISSION OF THE REDRESS TRUST TO THE MEETING ON
BAHRAIN—THE HOUSE OF LORDS 2 (Aug. 2004).
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work and the complex moral, legal, and political challenges involved in
any reparations process.6
Located off of the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf,
Bahrain sits in the center of the highly complicated and volatile Middle
East region.7 With a population of approximately 718,000,8 Bahrain is
the smallest of the six Persian Gulf States that make up the Gulf Cooperative Council (“GCC”).9 However, due in large part to its historical antecedents—the Sunni al-Khalifa tribe wrested control of the archipelago
from indirect Persian rule in 1782, and subsequently sought to consolidate and maintain power—Bahrain is considered “the most complex and
stratified of the Gulf states.”10 Today, members of the al-Khalifa family
and their “Sunni tribal allies” exercise most of the political and economic
power in Bahrain.11 At the bottom of the “social and political hierarchy”
are the al-Baharinah indigenous Shiite Arabs and all Persians regardless
of sect.12 Despite comprising approximately seventy percent of Bahrain’s
population, Shiites continue to endure systematic discrimination.13
6. See OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 345, 481–82 (K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt & P.
Lemmens eds., 2005); DINA SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(2d ed. 2005).
7. There have been three major wars in the Gulf States alone over the past twentyfive years: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Persian Gulf War (1991), and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (2003–present). KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31533,
THE PERSIAN GULF STATES: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 1 (2006) [hereinafter CRS REPORT
RL 31533].
8. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ba.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, BAHRAIN’S SECTARIAN CHALLENGE 7 (2005) [hereinafter ICG REPORT]. NonBahrainis comprise nearly 290,000 people, or forty percent of the population, and account for sixty-four percent of the workforce. Id.; CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7.
9. The other five GCC states are Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
10. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 1; C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8.
11. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 5. According to the International Crisis Group,
members of the royal family occupy at least 100 of the top 572 government posts, including 24 of 47 cabinet-level posts, 15 of the top 30 in the Ministry of the Interior, 6 of the
top 12 in the Ministry of Justice, and 7 of the top 28 in the Ministry of Defense. Id. See
also C.I.A. World Leaders: Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/worldleaders-1/world-leaders-b/bahrain.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). After the al-Khalifa
family and their “Sunni tribal allies” are other descendants of Sunni Arab tribes and then
hawalah, Iranian Sunni and Arab immigrants to Bahrain of over a century or more. ICG
Report, supra note 8, at 1.
12. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 1.
13. Id. The ongoing government ban of the 2006 “Al-Bandar report” released by the
Gulf Centre for Democratic Development does little to dispel this perception. The report
details a conspiracy led and funded by known official organizations, most notably the
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The story of Bahrain’s past and present bears telling for three primary
reasons. First, on a universal level, it is important to raise awareness of
the experiences of victims14 of grave human rights violations and to promote accountability. Second, on a geopolitical level, the United States
has a major stake in the stability of Bahrain15 and developments in the

Royal Court, to ensure the sustained political and economic dominance of the Sunni minority to the exclusion of Bahrain’s Shiite majority. The report includes evidence of plans
to fix elections, to undermine dissident groups, to disenfranchise Shiite populations, to
restrict the operation of civic organizations, and to facilitate a change in the country’s
demographics through pro-Sunni immigration policies. International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Authorities Reinforce Sweeping Media Ban, Internet Censorship on Controversial Report, http://canada.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/88028/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2007).
14. For purposes of this Note, the term “victim” should be understood consistent with
the 2006 Principles and defined as
[p]ersons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Where appropriate . . . the term “victim” also includes the
immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.
2006 Principles, supra note 2, para. 8.
15. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
3 (Apr. 23, 2007). In an effort to protect itself from its powerful neighbors, Bahrain cultivated a strategic alliance with the United States centered on defense issues. Id. The U.S.
naval command has maintained a presence in Bahrain since 1938, and the Fifth Fleet is
currently headquartered in Juffair, Bahrain. The headquarters is responsible for coordinating support missions by U.S. warships in the Iraq War, and conducting counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotrafficking operations in the Arabian Sea. Id. at 4. After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration took extensive measures to further strengthen the U.S.-Bahrain relationship. The two countries renewed a ten-year defense agreement in October 2001, which “provides U.S. access to Bahraini bases during a
crisis, the pre-positioning of strategic material (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and expanded exercises and U.S. training
of Bahraini forces.” Id. at 4. In March 2002, President Bush made Bahrain a major nonNATO ally, a status that allows for U.S. arms sales. Id. Moreover, the U.S. Congress
identified access to Bahrain-based military installations and airspace as critical to U.S.
military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa in addition to contingency operations or force projections in the Gulf and Southwest Asia. Human Rights Watch,
Bahrain: Events of 2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/bahrai14699.htm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2007). The Bush administration requested an estimated $17.3 million in military aid for Bahrain in 2007. Id.
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Persian Gulf region more generally.16 Third, on a historical level, a successful transitional justice experience in Bahrain could lend further support to the precedent established by the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (“IER”) in Morocco, and encourage other Gulf States, such as
Saudi Arabia, to make similar efforts to resolve mass human rights violations.
Beginning shortly after Bahrain achieved independence in 1971 and
continuing through the mid-1990s, the Bahraini government undertook a
campaign of political repression that targeted opposition activists, leftists, unionists, and others perceived as threats to the State.17 Hundreds of
Bahrainis and their families were forcibly exiled, and the use of torture
was “endemic.”18 Under the leadership of King Hamad, who assumed
power following the death of his father Amir ‘Isa in 1999, Bahrain has
undergone a series of political reforms and has slowly begun to confront
its past.19 In this vein, the King has expressed interest in pursuing national reconciliation and transitional justice to confront Bahrain’s legacy of
human rights abuses.20 In January 2006, the decision was made to provide monthly payments of $660 (250 Bahraini dinars) to 250 families
with either unemployed or elderly former exiles allowed back to the isl-

16. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 26. Approximately fifty-seven percent of
the world’s proven oil reserves (715 billion barrels) and about forty-five percent of the
world’s proven natural gas reserves (2462 trillion cubic feet) are located in Iran, Iraq, and
the GCC States. The United States imports about twenty percent of its net oil imports
from the Gulf States. Id.
17. See HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11; REDRESS,
REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5.
18. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5. See also HRW, ROUTINE
ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11; REDRESS, SUBMISSION OF THE REDRESS
TRUST TO THE MEETING ON BAHRAIN—THE HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 5.
19. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention (Continued), para. 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.656
(May 24, 2005) [hereinafter CAT Comm. 1]. Government officials refer to the initiative
as the “reform programme,” which is intended to “address long-festering domestic tensions, to establish a constitutional regime and to introduce political reforms.” The program includes the highly controversial amnesty laws Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001
and Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002. Id.
20. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Comments by the Government of Bahrain to the
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/BHR/CO/1/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter CAT Bahrain Comments].
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and as part of the reform program.21 However, there is only one known
instance to date of government compensation to a victim of torture.22
It is important to recognize the two different ways in which the term
“reparations” is used.23 Within the context of international law, the term
connotes the array of measures available to redress the different harms
that a victim may have suffered due to certain crimes.24 Therefore, under
international law, reparations may include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrecurrence.25 Such
measures, which include material and moral (or “symbolic”) undertakings by a society in individual or collective form, seek to restore the victim to the status quo ante by expressing a society’s “recognition, remorse
and atonement for harms inflicted.”26 Material reparations may include
monetary compensation, service packages providing healthcare or counseling to promote rehabilitation, restoration of property rights, or a
pension.27 Moral, or symbolic, reparations focus on allowing the victim’s
story to be told and promoting a sense of (nonlegal) justice, and may include official apologies, rehabilitation, and the creation of memorials or
other acts of remembrance.28 For reasons to be discussed later, symbolic
reparations may prove more valuable in facilitating the healing sought
through any material reparations process.29
However, the term is often used in a more narrow sense to refer to “the
design of programs (i.e., more or less coordinated sets of reparative
measures) with massive coverage.”30 Historically, most reparations pro-

21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2006:
BAHRAIN (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/81995.htm (last visited Sept.
1, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2006: BAHRAIN].
22. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 14.
23. Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS,
supra note 1, at 451, 453.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 157, 157–58 (2004).
27. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 182 (“[F]or those left destitute from the loss of a
breadwinner in the family, or left emotionally or physically shattered, financial reparation, basic medical benefits, and other support services will be necessary in order to begin
to repair the damage.”); De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at
157–58.
28. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453
29. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 180.
30. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453. In analyzing the design of reparations programs,
De Greiff believes emphasis should be placed on three goals: recognition, civic trust, and
social solidarity. Id. at 451.
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grams have incorporated elements of both connotations of the term.31
Such overlapping is logical given that settlement of court cases has often
directly or indirectly resulted in the formation of “administrative compensation schemes.”32 This Note will address both contexts. Nevertheless, unless otherwise indicated, the term “reparations” will refer to the
broader meaning as understood in international law.
This Note makes two central propositions. First, the existing international legal framework for reparations to victims of mass human rights
violations is inadequate as evidenced by the current situation in Bahrain.33 At least in the short term, legal recognition of a victim’s right to
reparations without an effective enforcement mechanism at the international level ultimately perpetuates the cycle of victimization for those
whom the pronouncement of such principles seeks to protect.34 Not only
must Bahraini victims of state abuse suffer the indignities of their mistreatment while being denied access to justice at the domestic level, but
they are also reassured of their rights by an international legal framework
incapable of guaranteeing them justice, thereby reinforcing their position
of helplessness.35 Nevertheless, at the supranational level, there is an

31. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 165.
32. Id.
33. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 203, 260 (discussing a theory of victims’ rights
and advocating “for a strengthening of current victims’ rights norms”). See also RohtArriaza, supra note 26, at 158 (“If reparations are so universally accepted as part of a
state’s human rights obligations, why have so few states emerging from periods of conflict or mass atrocity put viable programs into place?”).
34. See Michael Reisman & Janet Koven Levit, Reflections on the Problem of Individual Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, in THE MODERN WORLD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THOMAS BUERGENTHAL 419, 420–23 (Antonio A. Cançado
Trindade ed., 1996). However, this says nothing about the potential positive implications
of such a principle ripening into customary international law. See The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900) (relying on the customs and usages of civilized nations in concluding that “it is an established rule of international law . . . that coast fishing vessels . . .
are exempt from capture as prize of war”).
35. Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 421. Reisman and Levit address a further
indignity that victims must suffer as a result of the “normative gray gap” between the
international human rights framework and national law:
[V]ictims of [gross and systematic human rights] violations actually suffer
twice: first, in being the victims and second, in their obligation to participate,
with all other citizens, in paying compensation . . . . When we say that the state
is responsible and must compensate, we are really saying that the citizens of the
State, including the victims, must pay to compensate for [human rights] violations.
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emerging trend of enforcement for grave violations of international law,
which represents a positive development for human rights and the rule of
law.36 Second, the implementation of a “comprehensive and coherent
reparations program”37 in Bahrain is ultimately in the best legal, moral,
and political interests of the al-Khalifa regime and two of its closest
allies, Saudi Arabia38 and the United States.39
This Note is divided into three main sections. Part I discusses Bahrain’s history of human rights abuses and major advances and setbacks
in the nation’s ongoing transitional justice or “national reconciliation”
process. Part II discusses the effectiveness of the existing international
legal framework in guaranteeing victims of massive and systematic human rights abuses the right to a remedy and reparations. Part III explores
what an administrative reparations scheme for Bahraini victims might
look like in light of progress made.40 It draws upon lessons learned from
the Moroccan transitional justice experience, the first of its kind in the
Middle East,41 and introduces some key political issues involved in financing any such reparations program. The Note concludes by examinId. See also REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 8 (“Given the absence
of a regional human rights mechanism in the Middle East, the United Nations is the main
body monitoring Bahrain’s compliance with its human rights obligations.”).
36. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 203 (outlining a wide movement towards the recognition of the rights of victims of crime, whether domestic or international, or gross
violations of human rights); Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 419, 436 (discussing the
crystallization of an international norm that now explicitly includes human rights violations among the international crimes for which individuals bear responsibility); RohtArriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 163.
37. See De Greiff, supra note 23, at 452, 467–71.
38. Navigating Nebulous Waters: Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain 5
(Aug. 1, 2007) (unpublished working paper, on file with the International Center for
Transitional Justice, Middle East North Africa Unit) [hereinafter Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain] (“At present, Saudi Arabia arguably wields more influence
over Bahrain than any other country, both politically and economically. Moreover, as the
political and spiritual center of Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in supporting the rule of the Sunni al-Khalifa against Iranian influence and any potential Shia uprising.”).
39. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15, at 3. See also C.I.A.
World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8 (Bahrain is neighbor to the primary Middle Eastern petroleum sources and occupies a strategic location in the Persian Gulf through which
much of the Western world’s petroleum must transit to reach open ocean).
40. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 1; Prospects for
Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 8–10, 27–31 (discussing the internal
power dynamics of the regime, and relevant reforms and recent developments).
41. See generally International Center for Transitional Justice, Morocco, http://www.
ictj.org/en/where/region5/591.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007) [hereinafter ICTJ Morocco Overview].
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ing the likely implications of Bahrain’s current, limited course of action
and what other nations seeking to confront similarly repressive pasts can
learn from the Bahraini experience.
I. SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BAHRAIN
As a member of the international community of States, Bahrain is obligated to prevent the practice of torture within its sovereign territory and
to remedy any such violations once they have occurred.42 The Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts establish
that a State commits an internationally wrongful act when (1) conduct
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and (2) such conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.43 There is thus widespread consensus that a
State bears an international legal obligation to provide reparations where
state agents are responsible for the violative act.44 In fact, even in instances where the State’s direct involvement cannot be proven, the State
is still responsible if it was complicit in the violations or failed to exercise due diligence in investigating or prosecuting the violations.45
The prohibition against torture is widely understood to have achieved
jus cogens status.46 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Oth42. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) (“[T]he Convention is based upon recognition that [the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] is already established under international
law.”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 5, 8, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
43. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A.
Res. 56/83, art. 2, UN Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
44. E.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 163.
45. Id.
46. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332, 344 (defining a jus cogens norm, or a “peremptory norm of general international law,” as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”). See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714, 717 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties’ definition of jus cogens and stating that the prohibition against torture has “the
force of a jus cogens norm”); Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 30 (recognizing the prohibition of torture as a rule of jus cogens); BETH VAN SCHAACK &
RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 496 (2007).
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er Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.47

Even though Bahrain did not accede to CAT until March 6, 1998,48 and
the provisions of the treaty cannot be applied ex post facto, the State still
breached its obligation to prevent torture under customary international
law.49 Ironically, Article 19 of the 1973 Bahraini Constitution explicitly
proscribed physical and mental torture and the use of confessions obtained under torture or degrading treatment.50 Since ratifying CAT, Bahrain has the affirmative obligation to prevent torture by “tak[ing] effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture under its jurisdiction.”51 This requires States Parties to criminalize the act of torture and complicity or participation in torture.52
In 1973, only two years after Bahrain achieved its independence, Amir
‘Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa issued a decree officially making Bahrain an
47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
[hereinafter CAT]. There are 146 State Parties to CAT. United Nations Treaty Collection,
Convention Against Torture, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&id=129&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter UNTC CAT] (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). See
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. There are 164 State Parties to the
ICCPR. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4
&lang=en [hereinafter UNTC ICCPR] (last visited Feb. 27, 2009); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 20, Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition
of Torture and Cruel Treatment of Punishment (Article 7), para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/47/40
(1992).
48. UNTC CAT, supra note 47.
49. See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, para. 111
(July 21, 2000) (concluding that Article 1 of CAT “reflects customary international
law”); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 42, at 1.
50. BAHR. CONST. of 1973, art. 19(d). The prohibition is replicated in Article 19(d) of
the 2002 Amended Constitution. BAHR. CONST. of 2002, art. 19(d)
51. CAT, supra note 47, art. 2(1).
52. Id. art. 4(1).
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Islamic State in which Islamic law, or sharia, is the main source of legislation.53 Initial optimism within Bahraini civil society following the
enactment of the new constitutional regime quickly dissipated after the
issuance of the State Security Law of 1974.54 The law provided the legal
pretext for many of the human rights abuses perpetrated during the next
two decades by empowering security forces to arrest and detain for up to
three years any person who allegedly “perpetrated acts, delivered statements, exercised activities or [was] involved in contacts inside or outside
the country, which are of a nature considered to be in violation of the
internal or external security of the country.”55
Following the Amir’s decision in 1976 to dissolve the National Assembly—Bahrain’s parliament—the government relied on the State Security Law and a policy of forced exile to silence opposition.56 The repression intensified following the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran.57 The Revolution emboldened Bahrain’s Shiite majority to challenge the status quo rule of the Sunni elite.58 Fearing Iranian support for
opposition groups and the possibility of a coup, the Bahraini Government
cracked down.59 State security forces detained dozens of Shiite leaders
on allegations of plotting to overthrow the royal family.60 Detainees were
allegedly tortured and held incommunicado for months before they were
all found guilty by the State Security Court in 1982.61 Sentences ranged
from seven years to life in prison.62
Torture was most prevalent in Bahrain during the mid-1990s at the
height of the popular uprising that called for democratic reform and a
return to a constitutional system of governance.63 The report by the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture to the Human Rights Commission in 1997
describes the prevailing approach towards the practice during this epoch:
[M]ost persons arrested for political reasons in Bahrain were held incommunicado, a condition of detention conducive to torture. The Security and Intelligence Service . . . and the Criminal Investigation Department . . . were alleged frequently to conduct interrogation of such

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

BAHR. CONST. of 1973, art. 2.
HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 3–4.
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detainees under torture . . . said to be undertaken with impunity, with
no known cases of officials having been prosecuted for acts of torture
or other ill-treatment . . . .
In addition to its use as a means to extract a ‘confession,’ torture was
also reportedly administered to force detainees to sign statements
pledging to renounce their political affiliation, to desist from future anti-government activity, to coerce the victim into reporting on the activities of others, to inflict punishment and to instill fear in political opponents. The methods of torture reported include: falaqa (beatings on the
soles of the feet); severe beatings, sometimes with hose-pipes; suspension of the limbs in contorted positions accompanied by blows to the
body; enforced prolonged standing; sleep deprivation; preventing victims from relieving themselves; immersion in water to the point of near
drowning; burnings with cigarettes; piercing the skin with a drill; sexual assault, including the insertion of objects into the penis or anus;
threats of execution or of harm to family members; and placing detainees suffering from sickle cell anemia (said to be prevalent in the country) in air-conditioned rooms in the winter, which can lead to injury to
internal organs.64

Ian Henderson, a citizen of the United Kingdom and the head of the
State Intelligence Service from 1966 to 1998, is widely believed to be
responsible for the routine use of torture during his tenure.65 Although
Henderson himself admits that “vigorous interrogation” techniques were
used, he categorically denies engaging in torture or ordering his forces to
do so.66
In 1999, Amir Sheikh ‘Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa died and was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Hamad bin ‘Isa al-Khalifa. Recognizing that
social peace was essential to securing foreign investment—the royal
family’s major source of income—and its political survival, Sheikh Hamad launched a series of reforms.67

64. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S.
Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37 B,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (Jan. 10, 1997).
65. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 9; Human Rights Watch,
U.K. Should Open Files on Bahrain Torture: Role of U.K. National Seen as Pivotal, Jan.
10, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/01/10/uk-should-open-files-bahrain-torture.
Other individuals alleged to have committed, or overseen, torture include Adel Flaifel,
Khalid al-Wazzan, Abdulaziz Ateyatallah al-Khalifa, and Alistair Bain McNutt. HRW,
ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 23.
66. Neil Mackay, Scots Security Boss Branded “Master Torturer” of Bahrain, BIG
ISSUE (SCOTLAND), Jan. 8, 1997.
67. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 18.
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Prior to the adoption of a new constitution in February 2002, King
Hamad issued two legislative decrees central to any discussion about
justice and reparations for governmental abuses in Bahrain.68 Legislative
Decree No. 10 of 2001 established a “general amnesty . . . for crimes
affecting national security . . . committed by citizens before the enactment of this Law.”69 The Decree led to the release of all political detainees, both pretrial and posttrial, and hundreds of people forcibly exiled
were allowed to return.70
The initial positive effects of the amnesty were quickly overshadowed
by Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002, which clarifies the scope of Legislative Decree No. 10 and effectively grants immunity to security officers
and state officials from prosecution for human rights abuses perpetrated
prior to 2001.71 The key provision stipulates that no cases arising under
Legislative Decree No. 10 shall be heard by any “judicial authority,” regardless of “the person filing it and irrespective of the capacity against
whom it is filed, whether he is an ordinary citizen or a civilian or military
public servant.”72
II. THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW
Natural justice has long recognized that harms should be remedied.73 In
fact, some form of the right to redress can be found in “every organised
society.”74 The right to a remedy for victims of violations of international

68. Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001 with Respect to General Amnesty for Crimes
Affecting National Security; Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002 with Respect to Interpreting Certain Provisions of` Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001 with Respect to General
Amnesty for Crimes Affecting National Security [hereinafter Legislative Decree No. 56].
69. Id. The sole exception is in cases of crimes resulting in death. Id. art. 2.
70. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:
Visit to Bahrain 10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2002).
71. Legislative Decree No. 56, supra note 68; Comm. Against Torture, Consideration
of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/CR/34/BHR (June 21, 2005) [hereinafter CAT Comm. 2] (Expressing concern at
the “blanket amnesty extended to all perpetrators of torture or other crimes by Decree No.
56 of 2002 and the lack of redress available to victims of torture”); REDRESS,
REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 14.
72. Legislative Decree No. 56, supra note 68, art. 1, para. 2.
73. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 207; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157.
74. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 207. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163
(1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.”).
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human rights law is set forth in numerous international instruments.75
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) extends the right to an “effective remedy” by the appropriate national tribunal for any violations of a person’s fundamental rights as protected by
the constitution or by law.76 Article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) recognizes a “right to an effective
remedy.”77 Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) obligates States Parties to assure “effective protection and remedies” and access to “just and
adequate reparation or satisfaction” for violations of the rights contained
therein.78 Lastly, Article 14 of CAT mandates a State Party to “ensure in
its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the
means for as full rehabilitation as possible.”79
The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) in the Chorzow
Factory (Jurisdiction) Case decisively articulated the legal duty to compensate for a recognized harm.80 For its part, the International Court of
75. 2006 Basic Principles, supra note 2, pmbl. In addition to human rights law, the
right to a remedy is implicitly recognized in the context of international humanitarian
law, including in (1) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War; (2) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War; and (3) Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at
213–14.
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 42, art. 8.
77. ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 2. See also id. art. 9. Bahrain acceded to the ICCPR in
2006. UNTC ICCPR, supra note 47.
78. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Bahrain acceded to
the ICERD in 1990. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&id=319&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
79. CAT, supra note 47, art. 14(1). The 2006 Basic Principles also ground the right in
Article 3 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
18 October 1907 (Convention IV); Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of June 8, 1977; Article 39 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child; and Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 2006 Basic Principles, supra note 2, pmbl. For a discussion of the extensive
U.N. efforts preceding the introduction of the 2006 Basic Principles, see SHELTON, supra
note 6.
80. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 29 (“[I]t
is a principle of international law . . . that any breach of engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.”). According to Richard Falk, the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice concerning the Israeli security wall reaffirmed the validity of
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Justice (“ICJ”) applies the Chorzow approach of seeking to restore the
situation to what “would have existed” had no breach occurred.81 Similarly, current jurisprudence in both the Inter-American and European
human rights systems is clear that the underlying principle behind reparations is “full restitution” (restitutio in integrum) and the reestablishment
of the status quo ante.82 While legally and normatively unequivocal, such
reasoning illuminates the fundamental paradox inherent in any discussion
of reparations: specifically, the fact that it is ultimately impossible to restore the victim of any grave violation of human rights to the status quo
ante.83
National courts are supposed to serve as the gateway for victims seeking reparations for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian
law.84 In fact, an individual lacks standing to even bring a claim before
most international bodies until he or she has exhausted available domestic remedies.85 Ideally, national courts should operate in conjunction with
international criminal tribunals and treaty obligations as part of a “flexible strategy” to enforce an “international consensus” against impunity for
those who commit international crimes.86
However, experience has repeatedly proven the ineffectiveness of relying on national courts for such a purpose because the courts are “almost
always. . . inoperative” during the conflict periods in which massive and
systematic human right violations usually occur, and because “it takes
quite some time for courts to assume an independent stance capable of
this legal obligation in its finding that Israel has owed a duty to provide reparations to
Palestinians harmed by the building of the illegal wall on their territory. Falk, supra note
1, at 482–83.
81. SHELTON, supra note 6, at 92. But see Christian Tomuschat, Reparations for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 166 (arguing
that neither the PJIC nor the ICJ “has ever said that states are under an obligation to compensate their own citizens in cases where they have suffered harm at the hands of public
authorities”).
82. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 455. See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras,
Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 174 (1988) (“The
State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to
use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.”).
83. Roht-Arriaza, supra at 26, at 157–58 (“What could replace lost health and serenity; the loss of a loved one or of a whole extended family; a whole generation of friends;
the destruction of home and culture and community and peace?”).
84. Id. at 165.
85. Id.
86. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2001 I.C.J. 63,
78 (Feb. 14) (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
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finding powerful forces (usually the government itself) liable for violations.”87 In many cases, amnesty laws, relevant statutes of limitations,
and procedural mechanisms block victims from pursuing civil claims or
prohibit criminal prosecution.88
As a result, many victims of grave human rights violations have had
more success pursuing their claims in foreign courts.89 Particularly in the
wake of World War II, several countries have “statutorily institutionalized” the principle of universal jurisdiction to hold perpetrators of grave
human rights violations accountable.90 The universality principle recognizes that certain crimes are so reprehensible that they harm all people,
and therefore any nation may act on behalf of the international community to prosecute and punish those responsible, regardless of where the
crimes were committed.91 A national court may thus exercise universal
jurisdiction only over those crimes regarded as serious violations of in87. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 165.
88. Id. The failure by States to ensure victims their right to reparation is particularly
problematic where the substantive breach violated a jus cogens norm under customary
international law, such as the prohibition against torture. Thus, while States may argue
that the right to reparation for victims of torture is a secondary right that is derogable, at
least one commentator has rejected such reasoning as untenable because it enables States
to “in fact derogate from a peremptory norm by breaching it and not enforcing the respective consequences[,] an outcome [that] is conceptually incompatible with the very concept of jus cogens.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms and Reparation for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 3 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 28 (2003).
89. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 166.
90. Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 434. For a comprehensive survey of state
practice at the national level in approximately 120 countries relevant to universal jurisdiction prosecutions, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION—THE DUTY
OF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION (Sept. 2001). See also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART (June 2006).
91. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. See
also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A state may exercise
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern.”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“In
the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the
nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their
individual and collective interest.”); Regina v. Bow St. Magistrates, Ex p. Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 198 (“The jus cogens nature of the international crime
of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed.”).
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ternational law.92 Offenses rising to this level include war crimes, genocide, hostage taking, and torture.93
Perhaps the most effective mechanism to date has been through civil
claims under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), also referred to
as the Alien Tort Statute.94 The ATCA provides that “the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”95 Foreign nationals may thus seek relief for harm they have
suffered “in violation of the law of nations” or a treaty to which the United States is a party.96 States are immune to suit under ATCA, however,
and therefore plaintiffs may only bring suit against violators “in their
individual capacity.”97 Beginning with the seminal Filártiga v. PeñaIrala decision in 1980, foreign nationals have won numerous multimillion dollar judgments or verdicts against individual perpetrators including torturers, ex-generals, heads of state, and war criminals.98 However,
U.S. courts may only exercise jurisdiction over a defendant where the
court possesses in personam jurisdiction, and thus the defendant must be

92. See Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1 A.C. at 148, 198. See also Arrest Warrant of
11 April 2000, 2001 I.C.J. at 81 (finding universal jurisdiction appropriate for “those
crimes regarded as the most heinous by the international community”).
93. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2001 I.C.J. at 78.
94. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 166.
95. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009). In 1992, President George H.W.
Bush signed into law the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”). The TVPA
reinforces the ATCA by authorizing both U.S. and non-U.S. victims of torture and extrajudicial killing to bring a cause of action in the federal courts against those responsible.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009); Human Rights First,
The Alien Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act: Important Tools in the Fight
Against Impunity, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/w_context/w_
cont_12.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).
96. Human Rights First, supra note 98 (“U.S. courts have interpreted violations of the
‘law of nations’ under the ATCA to include crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture, rape, and summary execution.”).
97. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 235.
98. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 167 (noting that while large judgments under the
ATCA are generally uncollectible, they serve other purposes such as “allow[ing] victims
to publicly tell their stories, publiciz[ing] the violations at issue[,] . . . official[ly] recogni[zing] that the plaintiffs were wronged,” deterring perpetrators from traveling to certain
countries or assuming high-ranking government positions, and catalyzing domestic action
to address the violation); Human Rights First, supra note 99 (“[The] ATCA has been
used effectively on behalf of victims of gross human rights abuses perpetrated by wellknown political and military figures—such as Ferdinand Marcos, Radovan Karadzic, and
two Salvadoran generals—as well as by lesser-known government officials in different
parts of the world.”).
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physically present in the United States.99 Given this jurisdictional requirement, it seems unlikely—though not impossible—that Bahraini torture victims will have an opportunity to pursue claims under the ATCA.
Reparations in the context of transition from a period of authoritarianism to one of relative democracy is still a new concept within the field of
international law. Thus, if international law is largely understood to “codif[y] behavioral trends in state practice and shifting political attitudes on
the part of governments with the intention of stabilizing and clarifying
expectations about the future,” then the fact that the current system remains largely ineffective in holding Member States responsible for denying victims of massive rights violations their right to reparations is more
easily understood.100 Nevertheless, as long as “trends of national practice” in similar circumstances and “wider global trends toward individual
accountability for crimes against humanity” remain entirely subservient
to “domestic discretion” (and inaction), the right to reparation will continue to carry little practical significance for victims.101 If this is the case,
then perhaps Richard Falk will remain justified in “view[ing] reparations
as primarily an expression of moral and political forces at work in different contexts.”102
III. THE CURRENT BAHRAINI APPROACH
A. Bahrain’s Limited Progress
At present, the case of Bahrain serves as an example of a country
whose “new” leadership is willing to renounce its oppressive past without taking conclusive action to address it.103 While Bahrain has taken
99. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[D]eliberate torture
perpetrated under the color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus,
whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within [U.S.]
borders, [the ATCA] provides federal jurisdiction.”). See also Bassiouni, supra note 2, at
234.
100. Falk, supra note 1, at 480.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 485.
103. Id. at 495. The phrase “new leadership” is used loosely here, as many government
officials from the preceding era of repression remain in positions of power despite the
passing of the Amir and his son Hamad’s succession to power. The long-standing position of the Prime Minister, the Amir’s brother and the most powerful man in Bahrain
according to many accounts, is telling in this regard. The Prime Minister is generally
considered to be opposed to any “dramatic” reform. A power struggle has thus emerged
between the Prime Minister and the King’s son, Crown Prince Salman, who is head of the
Economic Development Board and more reform minded. The King has seemingly re-
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measures over the last decade to comply with its various treaty obligations, the government continues to obfuscate its unwillingness to ensure
that victims of torture have access to redress or other compensation.104
Bahrain’s civil code specifies that “[e]very unlawful act that has caused
damage to others makes an obligation upon the person who committed it
to pay compensation.”105 However, the law also shields public officials
from liability where they were acting in an official capacity or based
upon superior orders.106 Torture is also prohibited under multiple provisions of the penal code.107 Official statements praising the national reconciliation process stand in stark contrast to the government’s “failure
to investigate promptly, impartially, and fully the numerous allegations
of torture and ill-treatment and to prosecute alleged offenders,” and its
refusal to provide “complete and disaggregated information about the
number of detainees who have suffered torture or ill-treatment, including
any deaths in custody, the results of investigations into the causes, and
whether any officials were found responsible.”108
Furthermore, the al-Khalifa regime seemingly remains averse towards
viewing the situation as one of massive human rights violations, the
scope of which might necessitate the use of nontraditional judicial mechanisms, such as a government-administered reparations program.109
Rather, the regime has suggested that victims of torture or ill-treatment
have failed to exhaust access to redress through the Bahraini legal sysmained above the fray thus far, though he has sided with his son on certain issues. CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15, at 1; Prospects for Transitional Justice in
Bahrain, supra note 38, at 9–10. See also CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 21.
104. Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Events of 2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/
docs/2007/01/11/bahrai14699.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). On September 2, 2007,
Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa cautioned that “democracy, openness and freedom of opinion should not be used as a pretext to violate the law, sow sectarian sedition, or falsify truths in international arenas, claiming internal liberties are
curbed.” Invoking a popular government refrain, the Prime Minister explained that
“[p]latforms for expressing opinions are open ‘to accommodate all stances and trends as
long as they serve the national interests rather than personal designs’ . . . . He also warned
against what one Bahraini newspaper termed ‘misusing the parliament to raise controversial issues.’” Id.
105. Decree Law No. 19/2001, art. 158.
106. Id. art. 169.
107. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 10.
108. CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71, paras. 6–7. Other subjects of concern included the
“large number of allegations of torture . . . committed prior to 2001,” the blanket amnesty
extended to all alleged perpetrators of torture or other crimes by Decree No. 56 of 2002,
the lack of redress available to victims of torture, and the inadequate availability in practice of civil compensation and rehabilitation for victims of torture prior to 2001. Id.
109. See Id.
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tem.110 In reality, amnesty legislation has blocked attempts by torture
victims to bring claims.111 While the sheer magnitude of abuses in Bahrain does not reach levels witnessed in postconflict States such as Germany, Argentina, or Peru, the numbers are such that even an earnest attempt to address all of the cases through the national legal system would
inherently challenge certain bedrock norms—in particular, the premise
that “norm-breaking behavior is more or less exceptional.”112
Temporarily setting aside the fact that there is no evidence of victims
receiving access to justice through the Bahraini civil system and no
known instances of the State prosecuting perpetrators, a case-by-case
approach raises other issues as well.113 According to De Greiff, the two
biggest problems are that it serves to “disaggregate” both victims and the
reparations process as a whole.114 Historically, victims do not all receive
equal access to the courts, and disparities in damage awards inherently
create a “hierarchy” of victims.115 Moreover, an individualized approach
poses challenges from a publicity standpoint. Decisions pertaining to the
disclosure of case-specific facts may make it difficult to provide consistent publication of information about awards.116 The task of effectively
conveying to the public the “nature and magnitude” of reparations measures is compounded by this disaggregation.117 Finally, there is also the

110. CAT Comm. 1, supra note 19, para. 34. The Bahraini delegation before the
Committee Against torture stated:
Nobody had filed a claim for civil compensation based on allegations of torture
and nobody had brought a claim before the Constitutional Court alleging that
Decree No. 56 of 2002 was unconstitutional. That proved the unsound nature
and lack of credibility of claims for compensation that failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In effect, such claims merely damaged the interests of those who
had suffered human rights violations.
Id.
111. Presentation by Carla Ferstman, Director of Redress, Accountability for Human
Rights Violations in Bahrain, Aug. 23, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.redress.org/
reports/Presentation%20on%20Bahrain%2023%20Aug%2006%20_final_.pdf (noting that
“a number of claims have indeed been filed” and blocked).
112. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 454.
113. CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71, para. 6 (expressing concern at the “apparent failure
to prosecute alleged offenders, and in particular the pattern of impunity for torture and
other ill-treatment committed by law enforcement personnel in the past”); Presentation by
Carla Ferstman, supra note 111, at 2 (addressing the inability of torture victims to bring
claims as a result of the amnesty legislation).
114. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 458.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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risk that the completion of legal proceedings may not be coordinated
with other reparative efforts that may play an equally important role in
providing full restitution to victims.118
B. Financing Massive Reparations and Questions of Political Economy
Transitional societies seeking to finance administrative reparations
programs while consolidating democratic reforms typically face challenges resulting from the “political dimensions” of such an undertaking,
and the omnipresent “scarcity of resources” dilemma.119 While Bahrain is
certain to encounter a host of political, economic, and social obstacles in
financing a massive reparations program, the country’s power structure
and the conditions underlying its transition do present certain opportunities. Prominent among these is that, while the 1990s in Bahrain can aptly
be characterized as a time of domestic upheaval and state repression,
such circumstances differ considerably from those in a society simultaneously transitioning from war to peace, such as the case in El Salvador
or Guatemala.120
As a “relatively well-off” country with “a limited and easily identifiable set of victims,” Bahrain also fits the more traditional profile for governments that have implemented administrative reparations programs to
address massive human rights violations.121 Noteworthy in this regard is
that, similar to the experiences of nations such as Argentina and Chile,
governmental abuses in Bahrain were committed “against a largely unarmed opposition,” absent conditions of armed conflict.122

118. Id.
119. Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections from International Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 1, at 650, 652–53. The
“political dimension” encompasses the negotiations among key stakeholders necessary to
mobilize and allocate financial resources. Id. at 653.
120. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 174–75; Segovia, supra note 122, at 653.
121. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 169. According to the U.N. Development Programme’s 2008 Human Development Index (“HDI”) Rankings, Bahrain ranks 32nd out
of 179 countries, making it a “high human development” country ahead of most of its
Gulf neighbors and most developing countries. U.N. Development Programme’s 2008
Human Development Index Rankings, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2009). The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated
(measured by adult literacy and enrollment at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level),
and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity income).
122. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 169.
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Although Bahrain enjoys relative economic prosperity,123 any program
of reparations will require the government to reallocate its current spending priorities and/or seek additional financial support.124 This is likely to
remain a major political challenge without any significant changes to
Bahrain’s internal power dynamics125 and in light of difficulties to date
establishing consensus amongst national parties on the scope of any potential compensation payments by the government.126 However, the recent implementation of a controversial one percent income tax on all
public and private sector employees to help fund a national unemployment insurance plan indicates that the government has the ability to mobilize the necessary resources where the political will exists.127 Ultimately, any progress on this front will require “the support of the Crown
Prince and those loyal to him as this block was instrumental in advancing
the key reforms of 2000, and national reconciliation is a critical precondition to the Crown Prince’s larger political agenda of modernizing Bahrain.”128
Reparations, by their very nature, require the State to acknowledge its
wrongful conduct by recognizing and compensating the victims.129 The
Bahraini government has proved tremendously reluctant to acknowledge
and accept responsibility.130 Instead, it has offered only blanket condemnation131 for the “situation” combined with limited progress.132 Such re-

123. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8. “Facing declining oil reserves,
Bahrain has turned to petroleum processing and refining and has transformed itself into
an international banking center.” In 2007, Bahrain had an estimated real growth rate
(GDP) of 6.7%. Id.
124. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655.
125. See supra note 103.
126. MPs Deadlocked over Riots Relief, GULF DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007. Members
of parliament were unable to reach agreement on a proposal to compensate victims of
political unrest during the 1990s. Potential beneficiaries discussed included victims of
abuse as well as property owners who suffered damages. Id.
127. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: July/Aug. 2007, Bahrain: First Gulf Income Tax; Press Law; Truth and Reconciliation Committee,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=showIssue&backIssue=7/1/2007 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2009). The income tax is the first of its kind for an Arab Gulf State. Under the
law, both citizens and noncitizens are required to contribute, though only citizens will
receive benefits. Id.
128. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 39.
129. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655.
130. See CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71.
131. See, e.g., CAT Bahrain Comments, supra note 20, para. A(3) (The national reconciliation process “put an end to internal strife and brought the country out of the political and social crisis which had beset it, closing a chapter on the past and helping to
create a climate conducive to the enjoyment of public freedoms.”).
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luctance is undoubtedly tied to the fact that “programs of reparation are
part of a more general human rights agenda, which involves the defense
of traditionally marginalized social groups.”133 Sectarian tension in Bahrain continues to simmer because the ruling Sunni elite have systematically marginalized Bahrain’s Shiite majority.134 Therefore, any program
of reparations in Bahrain is inextricably tied to the access and exercise of
power.135 This connection helps to explain the reticence exhibited by the
Bahraini elite in earnestly addressing the past—particularly the Prime
Minister—and why the ruling regime has taken only carefully calculated
measures designed to ease pressure without producing any fundamental
changes to the Bahraini power structure and its hold on power.136
Hypothetically speaking, would nations with a strong interest in the
stability of Bahrain—such as the United States or Saudi Arabia—ever
contribute financially to a program of reparations in Bahrain?137 Historically, foreign governments have made only limited financial contributions in support of such programs.138 One explanation for this trend is
that foreign States view financing reparations as a responsibility belonging to the State in transition.139 Another explanation is that given the political nature of reparations programs, foreign governments are hesitant
to get involved in a situation that could result in conflict with a govern132. On November 11, 2007, the cabinet announced the creation of a National Human
Rights Authority. The body will be responsible for setting relevant policies, addressing
human rights violations, and communicating with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 5, Issue 9: Nov. 2007, Bahrain:
Human Rights Authority; Journalists on Trial; Marriage Age Set, Carnegie Endowment
for Int’l Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=
19783&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme.
133. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655.
134. See ICG REPORT, supra note 8. According to a 2006 assessment by the Economist, while Bahrain has a per capita income of close to $20,000, a third of the native Bahraini workforce earns less than $600 a month—suggesting a significant disparity in the
distribution of wealth within the country’s native population. Playing by Unfair Rules;
Bahrain, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006.
135. See generally Segovia, supra note 119, at 655.
136. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 20. While promising, Bahrain’s political
reforms are consistent with efforts ongoing in the other Gulf states, none of which “aim
to fundamentally restructure power in any of these states.” Id. at summary.
137. This question does not imply that either the United States or Saudi Arabia bear
any legal responsibility under international law for the practice of torture in Bahrain. This
is an entirely different inquiry requiring analysis under the rules on state responsibility
and the attribution of wrongful conduct to a State. Heidy Rombouts, Pietro Sardaro &
Stef Vendeginste, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, supra note 6, at 345, 482.
138. Segovia, supra note 119, at 659.
139. Id.
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ment or an influential sector of a country such as the military.140 It thus
seems highly unlikely that the United States would be willing to contribute to any such effort. Saudi Arabia is also unlikely to contribute financially, particularly given its own shameful human rights record141 and
recent internal civil unrest.142
C. The Moroccan Transitional Justice Experience
A large-scale reparations program is not an unprecedented measure for
a State in the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region. Since
1990, Morocco has implemented various transitional justice mechanisms
in an effort to confront its repressive past, specifically the gross human
rights abuses committed by the State in the decades following Moroccan
independence in 1956.143 While Morocco’s experience is certainly
unique and should not be understood as mapping directly to other MENA
States, it offers critical insights about “both the promise and limits of
truth-telling and reparations” and is beneficial to any discussion of transitional justice in Bahrain.144
140. Id.
141. Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Developments: Saudi Arabia
2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/saudia14717.htm (last visited Dec.
19, 2007) (“Overall human rights conditions remain poor in Saudi Arabia . . . . Saudi law
does not protect many basic rights and the government places strict limits on freedom of
association, assembly, and expression. Arbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture of
detainees, restrictions on freedom of movement, and lack of official accountability remain serious concerns.”).
142. The U.S. war in Iraq and the corresponding empowerment of Iraqi Shiites and
high levels of sectarian violence that resulted have produced “acute fears of potential
Shiite unrest” in Saudi Arabia. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 5.
143. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. Victims of government repression included leftists, Islamists, Saharawi independence activists, unionists, military dissidents,
intellectuals, and others considered to be threats to the State. INT’L CTR FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, WORKSHOP ON THE GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF REPARATIONS AS A
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MEASURE IN IRAQ 44 (2007) [hereinafter ICTJ WORKSHOP] (on file
with the International Center for Transitional Justice, Middle East North Africa Unit).
144. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44. For a discussion on the uniqueness of the
Moroccan experience, see King Mohamed VI, The Speech of His Majesty the King Mohamed VI Announcing the Formation of the Commission for Equity and Reconciliation
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=1297 (“Reflecting
on the different international experiences in this particular field, one must acknowledge
that Morocco, acting with wisdom and courage, has managed to come up with a model of
its own.”). See also MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, SUMMARY OF THE
FINDINGS OF THE FINAL REPORT 12 (Dec. 2005) (In examining “the issue of reparations
through the experiences of truth commission that were formed across the world . . . the
Commission concluded that there is no one model that can be adopted.”); An Interview
with Hanny Megally, ALL AFRICA, Aug. 4, 2006 (“Each country has its own specificity as
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Morocco’s initial transitional justice efforts began in 1990, under the
late King Hassan II, who presided over the most intense era of repression
commonly known as the “years of lead” and lasting from the 1960s until
the early 1990s.145 To quell mounting criticism, the King established the
Human Rights Advisory Council (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de
l’Homme) (“CCDH”), and the government released hundreds of political
dissidents throughout the early part of the decade while taking limited
measures to reform its incommunicado detention policies.146 Despite
making formal reservations to each, Morocco ratified CAT, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1993.147
Similar to Bahrain, the death of King Hassan in 1999 and the succession to the throne of his more reform-minded son, Mohammed VI, presented a new opportunity to confront many of the unresolved issues tied
to governmental abuses.148 King Mohammed VI ordered the formation of
an independent Indemnity Commission (“IC”) within the CCDH in order
to compensate Moroccans “‘who suffered moral or physical prejudice as
a result of enforced disappearance or arbitrary detention.’”149 Over the
course of four years, the IC decided more than 5000 cases and awarded a

to how it will go about addressing a legacy of past abuses.”); Habib Toumi, Bahrain
‘Must’ Have Its Own Justice System, GULF NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007 (quoting Joe Stork, Director of Human Rights Watch Middle East and North Africa Division, in discussing
transitional justice generally in Bahrain: “[t]he process has to be home-grown because
every country has its own realities and Bahrainis have to work together to build their
own”).
145. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41.
146. Id. According to Human Rights Watch: “[i]n the late 1980’s Hassan II began
releasing batches of political prisoners . . . . In 1991, Hassan II freed about 270 persons
whom the security services had ‘disappeared’ as long as nineteen years earlier. In 1994,
the King amnestied more than 400 political prisoners. Opposition figures returned to
Morocco after years of exile . . . .” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MOROCCO’S TRUTH
COMMISSION: HONORING PAST VICTIMS DURING AN UNCERTAIN PRESENT 6–7 (Nov. 2005)
[hereinafter HRW MOROCCO].
147. HRW MOROCCO, supra note 146, at 7.
148. Susan Slyomovics, No Buying off the Past: Moroccan Indemnities and the Opposition, 229 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 34 (Winter 2003). See generally Heidy Rombouts, Pietro Sardaro & Stef Vendeginste, supra note 137, at 345, 481–82. “Regime succession” is
a typical precursor to reparations for gross and systematic human rights violations, and it
is a well established principle of international law that “neither a change of government
nor a major regime change accompanied by a political transition and a constitutional
reform of the state” disengages the State’s liability for human rights violations committed
by a previous regime. Id.
149. Susan Slyomovics, A Truth Commission for Morocco, MIDDLE EAST REP. 218
(Spring 2001).
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total of approximately $100 million in reparations.150 However, the IC
was criticized on “legal, moral and emotional” grounds.151 While the indemnity scheme acknowledged “implicitly, rather than explicitly, an
official policy of illegal state practices,” compensation did little to meet
the demands of victims seeking truth and justice, particularly those calling for the punishment of perpetrators.152 Moreover, the IC was derided
for its lack of transparency, for the complicity of its administrators in
past governmental human rights violations, and for its limited mandate,
which precluded the body from resolving thousands of cases.153
In 2004, King Mohammed VI took another major step by establishing
the Commission for Equity and Reconciliation (Instance Equité et
Réconciliation) (“IER”).154 He declared the IER to be “equivalent to a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.”155 The scope of the
IER’s mandate was much broader than that of the IC, extending to “gross
human rights violations that occurred between 1956 and the end of
1999.”156 As a result, the IER had broad authority to assess, research,
investigate, arbitrate, and make recommendations on claims not only for
forced disappearance and arbitrary detention, but also for torture, sexual
abuse, and deprivation of the right to life due to unrestrained use of state
force and forced exile.157 The IER was also responsible for continuing

150. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41.
151. Slyomovics, supra note 148, at 35.
152. Id. As Houria Esslami, sister of political activist and doctor Mohamed Esslami
who was “disappeared” in 1997, explained:
[I]ndemnification should be the last stage of this dossier. In the first place, it is
necessary to acknowledge all the disappeared, free those still living, speak the
truth about the reasons for their disappearance and incriminate those responsible. It is only at that moment that one can speak about indemnification . . . .
Id.
153. Id. The fact that the Commission did not have access to the extensive files of the
security services and the Interior Ministry proved particularly damaging. ICTJ Morocco
Overview, supra note 41.
154. Commission for Equity and Reconciliation, Mandate and Tasks, http://www.ier.
ma/article.php3?id_article=1305 (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). The Commission’s mandate
was from January 2004 to November 2005. The Commission was made up of a president
and sixteen members, all appointed by the King upon recommendations by the CCDH.
Nine of the members, including its president, were from the CCDH. Many of its members
including its now-deceased president, Driss Benzekri, were former prisoners and torture
survivors. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 47.
155. MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the work of the IC by compensating victims and their heirs.158 While the
IER was only granted “non-judiciary powers” of investigation, “public
authorities were obliged to cooperate because of [the Commission’s]
royal support.”159 The IER was also prohibited from identifying individual perpetrators and could thus only identify institutions responsible for
abuses.160
During the course of its activities, the Commission considered more
than 22,000 applications and held “victim-centered, public hearings” televised throughout country.161 The IER released its final report in December 2005.162 The report details the responsibility of both State and
nonstate actors for gross violations committed, and offers suggestions
and recommendations for providing victims with the necessary “moral
and medical rehabilitation and social reinsertion.”163 Given the extent of
suffering endured by certain communities and regions, the Commission
focused extensively on communal reparations as well. The Commission
thus urged the “adoption of socio-economic and cultural development
projects” tailored to those cities and regions, and “specifically recommended the conversion of former illegal detention centers.”164 The report
also outlines specific measures that the Moroccan government and civil
society can undertake to guarantee nonrepetition in the future.165 Finally,
the report addresses the need for official acknowledgement of wrongdoing by recommending that the Prime Minister apologize publicly for
past abuses.166
The IER reparations program ultimately covered approximately 16,000
individuals.167 About $85 million in reparations was distributed to beneficiaries.168 These beneficiaries received compensation checks, which
158. Commission for Equity and Reconciliation, supra note 157. As part of its task to
unveil the truth, the Commission is responsible for “[r]edressing damages to the victims
and/or their inheritors through material compensation, rehabilitation, social integration,
and all other adequate means of reparations.” Id.
159. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41.
160. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 45.
161. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. The IER held seven public hearings,
which were widely attended and at times included the King’s senior advisers, government
officials, opposition party leaders, diplomats, international press, and civil society representatives. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 47.
162. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44.
163. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41; ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44;
MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 1.
164. MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 2.
165. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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included a letter of apology from the State.169 Minimum payouts to victims were set at 15,000 dirham (approximately $200 in 2006).170 In addition, all victims were eligible to receive health care.171 The Moroccan
government funded the bulk of the reparations program with some assistance from the European Union.172
Due to the restriction against identifying individual perpetrators, the
IER has been criticized for maintaining impunity.173 The subsequent failure to prosecute or recommend the prosecution of individuals has reinforced the belief “some victims may feel that reparations without accountability is only limited justice.”174
The IER was also criticized for not doing more to publicize its work
and ensure victims adequate notification of the application deadline.175
This is partially attributable to the large size of Morocco and the many
remote communities disconnected from the national media.176 Any reparations program in Bahrain should draw from the Moroccan experience
by undertaking a comprehensive public information strategy aimed at
making Bahraini victims aware of available compensation and the relevant deadlines. This should not be difficult given Bahrain’s “highly developed” communications infrastructure and the small size of the country.177
169. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 48. The one-page letter acknowledged and
apologized for government human rights violations. The package also included a ruling
on the victim’s individual case, detailing “the specific violations to which the victim was
subjected and the amount allocated as compensation.” Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 49. For many victims,
moral and legal measures of reparations are fundamental, while monetary compensation is controversial and problematic. . . . [V]ictims ask for official and
societal acknowledgement that they were wronged, restoration of their good
name, [and] knowledge of who and how it was done. . . . [C]ompensation was
never enough, or even the most important thing. They especially note the hollowness of material reparations when there has been no pronounced reluctance
to prosecute those responsible.
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 180 (discussing the findings of the comparative study by
the Chilean human rights organization Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo).
174. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 49.
175. Id. The IER received 8000 applications after the one-month deadline. Id.
176. Id.
177. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8. Bahrain has a “highly developed”
communications infrastructure and a total land area of 665 sq km (compared to Morocco’s 446,300 sq km). Id. Bahrain is also one of the most urbanized countries in the world,
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CONCLUSION
Both the story of victim’s rights under international law and the story
of Bahrain’s transitional justice experience are far from written. Efforts
to close the gap between the rhetoric of human rights and the enforcement of such rights must remain a top priority. The inability of Bahraini
torture victims to access justice at either the regional or international level underscores this need. The U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the
2006 Basic Principles marks an important step in the evolution of human
rights law towards a more “victimcentric” framework,178 but the doctrine
must be translated into action in order to protect “the inherent dignity . . .
of all members of the human family” on which “freedom, justice and
peace in the world” is based.179
In Bahrain, recent human rights developments serve as a reminder that
there are many obstacles to overcome in guaranteeing respect for essential human rights at the domestic level.180 Nevertheless, there are also
positive signs that some degree of justice may be forthcoming for Bahraini victims of state abuse. In June 2007, eleven Bahraini human rights
organizations and opposition groups took the unprecedented step of
forming a reconciliation pressure group to lobby the government for the
creation of a truth and reconciliation committee (“TRC”) to address human rights abuses committed by the government from the 1970s to the
1990s.181 However, there has been no indication that the TRC will become official through government support or participation, or by grantas its small population of 708,000 is heavily concentrated in the country’s two major
cities, Manama and al-Muharraq, and in main towns such as Jidd Hafs, Sitra, al-Rifaa,
and Madinat. HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 9.
178. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 204.
179. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 42, prmbl.
180. See Bahrain Center for Human Rights, BCHR: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair
Trials in Bahrain During 2006, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/1626 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2007) (“The year 2006 has witnessed an extreme decline in public freedoms in
Bahrain, especially in regards to freedom of expression and opinion and the freedom of
assembly.”); International Freedom of Expression eXchange, Bahrain: Twenty-Six IFEX
Members Slam Government’s Latest Attack on Free Expression, http://canada.ifex.
org/en/content/view/full/88152/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2007) (calling upon the Bahraini
authorities to “halt their attacks upon freedom of expression, to abolish abusive laws, and
to respect their commitment to international charters and covenants, in particular Article
19 of the ICCPR.”).
181. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: July/Aug. 2007, supra note 127. Suggestions for the TRC’s potential mandate included truth-finding and
compensation payments to those who sustained injuries or were subjected to torture, deportation, or arbitrary arrest. Members also called for punishment of those allegedly responsible for torture in direct contravention of Decree 56, which pardoned all political
prisoners and perpetrators responsible for human rights violations. Id.
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ing TRC investigators access to files or personnel.182 Still, a follow-up
coalition meeting was held in September 2007 and included the participation of representatives from the International Center for Transitional
Justice.183 While the TRC’s launch date was set for December 10, 2007,
the anniversary of the UDHR,184 no announcement has been made at the
time of writing.
Bahrain appears to be at a crossroads. For the Al-Khalifa regime, prolonged inaction without officially confronting and remedying past abuses
risks igniting wide-scale civil unrest comparable to levels witnessed in
the 1990s, or worse.185 Such a risk is compounded by the growing influence of Shiite Iran in regional affairs, and regional destabilization caused
by the ongoing sectarian violence in nearby Iraq.186 Widespread civil unrest in Bahrain would also be detrimental to the United States and Saudi
Arabia, which depend on the ruling regime and the stability of the island
kingdom in pursuing their respective geopolitical and economic interests.187 On the other hand, official measures of reparation would build

182. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 2. The government remains steadfast in its position that the 2002 pardon remains valid, and that the
pardon includes all parties. As such, explained Social Development Minister Fatima alBalooshi, “[T]he law does not allow for review of cases that fall within the timeframe of
the pardon . . . .” DPA: Bahraini NGO’s, Opposition Launch Truth and Reconciliation
Panel, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, June 27, 2007.
183. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: Oct. 2007, Bahrain:
NDI Returns; Cabinet Change; Anti-Corruption Efforts, http://www.carnegieendowment.
org/arb/?fa=showIssue&backIssue=10/1/2007 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
184. Id.
185. For coverage of escalated clashes between state Security forces and protesters, see
Michael Slackman, Sectarian Tension Takes Volatile Form in Bahrain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 2009; Bahrain: Shi’ite Riots Orchestrated, MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE, June 12, 2007;
Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Jailed Protesters Show Signs of Severe Abuse, June 1,
2007, http://hrw.org.english/docs/2007/06/01/bahrail6051_txt.htm; Three Policemen Injured in Third Day of Bahrain Violence, KHALEEJ TIMES, May 22, 2007.
186. See CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7.
187. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15; Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38.
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upon the encouraging precedent established in Morocco while demonstrating that political survival and respect for human rights are not mutually exclusive in the Middle East of tomorrow.
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